

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	CDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC		X		
11	IG		X		
12	Compt		X		
13	D/EEO		X		
14	D/Pers		X		
15	D/OLL		X		
16	C/PAO		X		
17	SA/IA		X		
18	AO/DCI		X		
19	C/IPD/OIS		X		
20	NIO/SP		X		
21					
22					
23	SUSPENSE			Date	

Remarks

3637

9 December 1983

STAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DCI

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8894
add-on

CONFIDENTIAL

December 8, 1983

Executive Registry

88-9155/9

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Energy
 The Director, Office of Management and Budget
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director, Arms Control and
 Disarmament Agency
 The Director, Office of Science and
 Technology Policy
 The Administrator, National Aeronautics and
 Space Administration

SUBJECT: Back-up Material for Consultations on the
 Strategic Defense Initiative (C)

A short paper to provide you with additional unclassified information on the strategic defense initiative is attached at Tab A. This paper has been keyed to a short briefing based on the charts at Tab B. The briefing team, if called upon, will actually use an expanded version of the briefing outlined here. (C)

J. M. Poindexter
 Deputy Assistant to the President
 for National Security Affairs

cc: The Vice President

Attachments

Tab A Background paper
 Tab B Charts

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

L-117

CD 0-116

DCI
 EXEC
 REG

BRIEFING ON

THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

President's Initiative

• On March 23, 1983, President Reagan announced a long-term goal of eliminating the threat of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles through the development of defensive system technologies and thereby decreasing U.S. reliance on offensive nuclear arms to maintain its security and that of its allies. (Chart 1)

• As a first step, the President directed that: (Chart 2)

→ an assessment be conducted of a broad range of relevant technologies; and

→ an analysis be made of the strategy and arms control implications.

• This work has been completed and submitted to the President for review.

• After the review and consultation with members of Congress and our allies, the President will make a decision on a defensive technologies R&D program.

Defensive Technologies

• Recent advances in defensive technologies and last summer's thorough examination of these technologies by a wide range of experts lead us to believe that: (Chart 3)

→ emerging technologies would make development of defense against ballistic missiles possible; and that

→ a vigorous R&D program, broadly based but highly result-oriented, should be pursued. This would permit informed decisions on whether to initiate, in the early 1990s, a full scale engineering development phase which ultimately could lead to a deployed defensive capability after the year 2000.

- Such a system probably would be multi-layered; that is, designed to destroy ballistic missiles or their warheads in all four phases of their flight: boost, post boost, mid-course, and reentry. (Chart 4)
- Significant intermediate technologies can be demonstrated over the next 10 years for performance verification, and also to provide visible evidence of U.S. progress and resolve and as a hedge against Soviet developments.
- Technologies which will enhance the survivability of the system, particularly the space-based elements, are vital to the program and will be fully explored.
- The R&D program must include a means to identify and support innovative ideas, especially those from the U.S. academic community by reserving a portion of the DABM budget for such investigations.

Cost

- Prior to the President's initiative, approximately \$18 billion was already planned to be spent by the Departments of Defense and Energy during Fiscal Years 1985 through 1989 for development of relevant technologies (Chart 5).
 - Increase of up to 25 to 50 percent will permit technologically limited R&D on the most promising concepts.
 - However, the specific budget level will be determined in the context of total requirements for Fiscal Years 1985-89 which will be reviewed and approved by the President. It will then be presented to Congress in January 1984.

Hedge Against Soviet Program

- The decision to pursue a defensive technologies R&D program is not solely a U.S. initiative. (Chart 6)
- The Soviet Union currently is:
 - upgrading the world's only active BMD system, which currently consists of large battle management radars and four launch complexes consisting of a number of smaller engagement radars and GALOSH interceptor missiles;

--- pursuing R&D on a rapidly deployable ABM system;
and

--- pursuing a substantial, advanced defensive technologies program, including directed energy technology, which could lead to the testing of space-based ABM systems in the mid-1990s and deployment after the turn of the century.

* The Soviet Union also is deploying a surface-to-air missile system, the SA-10, and is flight testing another, the SA-X-12, both of which potentially could intercept some types of U.S. ballistic missiles.

* The pace of Soviet R&D programs and production capabilities would enable the Soviet Union to deploy a widespread, ground-based interceptor ABM system within the next ten years.

* A U.S. defensive technologies program, therefore, is a prudent response to Soviet R&D activities in this field and as a hedge against unilateral Soviet efforts to achieve an advanced defense system.

-- unilateral Soviet efforts to achieve an effective, advanced defense against ballistic missile system if successful, in concert with the Soviet Union's massive offensive forces and its already impressive air and passive defense capabilities, would have a very serious, adverse effect on our security and that of our allies.

Deterrence and Stability Implications

* The strategic defense initiative is consistent with, and in no way alters the long-standing U.S. policy of deterrence.

* Defenses against ballistic missiles have potential for increasing deterrence and strategic stability by: (Chart 7)

-- reducing the utility of preemptive attacks on retaliatory forces.

-- denying an aggressor confidence in the results of any attack;

-- reducing or eliminating (when combined with effective air defenses) effective counterforce options--both limited and major (allows penetration of insufficient weapons to significantly

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damage military assets, leaving only counter-value options of limited utility and credibility); and

- decreasing incentive to MIRV ballistic missiles through boost-phase intercepts.

- For the foreseeable future, however, we will have to depend on a strong, modernized and effective TRIAD to maintain deterrence.

- Some uncertainties affecting deterrence and stability remain to be resolved as we learn more about the technical characteristics of defensive systems and likely Soviet responses. The uncertainties relate to:

- effectiveness of U.S. and Soviet defensive systems and each side's perception of the other's capability;
- the vulnerabilities of the defensive system;
- the size, composition and vulnerabilities of each side's offensive nuclear forces; and,
- the overall NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance, and means to deter conventional force aggression.

Arms Control Implications

- The research and development effort envisaged by the President's initiative is consistent with current U.S. treaty obligations. The initial stage of the President's initiative contemplates only research on a broad range of defensive technologies. (Chart 8)

- The President's initiative complements the goals of our INF and START negotiations--significant reductions in offensive nuclear armaments:

- defenses have potential for reducing the value of ballistic missiles, thus increasing the likelihood of negotiated reductions.

Current Programs and Force Policy

- The initiative in no way signals a shift in priority away from the modernization of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear

assets and conventional forces essential to the maintenance of deterrence over the next decade or two. (Chart 9)

Defense Initiative and the Allies

• U.S. commitment to the defense of the allies is not changed by strategic defense initiative.

• The U.S. intends to work closely with its friends and allies to ensure that our common deterrent remains strong and effective and that allied security against aggression is enhanced by the initiative. (Chart 10)




OBJECTIVES AND TASKS

- PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH (23 MAR 83)
 - REDUCE EXCLUSIVE RELIANCE ON RETALIATION, INCREASE CONTRIBUTION OF DEFENSE
 - LONG TERM R&D PROGRAM
- NSDD 85 (25 MAR 83)
 - GOAL: ELIMINATE THREAT OF BALLISTIC MISSILES
 - STUDY STRATEGY AND DEFINE AN R&D PLAN
- NSSD 6-83 (18 APR 83): TWO STUDIES TO BE SUBMITTED OCT 83
 - FUTURE SECURITY STRATEGY STUDY: POLICY ASPECTS
 - DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY STUDY: LONG-TERM R&D PROGRAM PLAN



ORGANIZATION FOR NSSD 6-83





FLETCHER STUDY CONCLUSIONS

DEVELOPMENT OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES CAN MAKE DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES POSSIBLE

PACE

- NOW

BROAD-BASED, FOCUSED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

- ### • EARLY 1990s

FULL SCALE ENGINEERING


- 2000

DEVELOPMENT DEPLOYMENT

FEATURES

- MULTIPLE LAYERS
 - TECHNICAL DEMONSTRATIONS
 - SURVIVIBILITY
 - INNOVATION

MULTIPLE LAYERED DEFENSE





FUNDING OBJECTIVES

(THEN YEAR R&D DOLLARS IN BILLIONS)

ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR
RELEVANT TECHNOLOGIES

ENHANCED R&D
PROGRAM

25-50% INCREASES

FY 85 85-89

 1.8 18

HEDGE AGAINST SOVIET PROGRAM

Soviet Union currently:

- upgrading world's only active BMD system.
- pursuing R&D on a rapidly deployable ABM system.
- pursuing advanced defensive technologies program.

U.S. defensive technologies program, therefore, a prudent hedge against unilateral Soviet deployment;

-- unilateral Soviet deployment would result in Soviet military superiority and adversely affect Western and Japanese security.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE

- Initiative constitutes no change to long-standing policy of deterrence.
- Effective defenses against ballistic missiles have potential for increasing deterrence and stability:
 - significant reduction in utility of preemptive attack;
 - increase in attack uncertainties;
 - reduction or elimination of effective counterforce options, when combined with effective air defenses;
 - decrease incentive to MIRV ballistic missiles.

ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS

- President's initiative consistent with current U.S. treaty obligations:
 - initial stage of initiative contemplates only research on a broad range of defensive technologies.
- President's initiative complements goal of INF and START negotiations-- significant reductions in offensive nuclear armaments.
 - defenses have potential for reducing value of ballistic missiles, thus increasing likelihood of negotiated reductions.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT PROGRAMS
AND FORCE POLICY

- Modernization of strategic- and intermediate-range nuclear assets and conventional forces remains a top U.S. priority.
 - force modernization necessary to deterrence while defensive technologies in development stage;

IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIES

- U.S. commitment to defense of allies is not changed by defense initiative.
- U.S. will work closely with allies to ensure that defensive technology initiative strengthens U.S. and allied security.

JG
10-23-1973